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Marco Bernini
CRAWLING CREATING CREATURES
On Beckett’s liminal minds
The continuity and contiguity between animal and human beings in Beckett’s work has
been the subject of sustained critical attention. The recurring dehumanisation or degen-
eration of his characters’ mental faculties and behaviours has largely been analysed as
an ‘ostensible animalization’ of human nature – following a reading of the ‘crea-
turely’ spectrum as a regression from the human to the animal. In contrast, this article
considers the creaturely level in Beckett’s narrative as occupied by undeveloped
human cognisers as opposed to (and sometimes rancorously opposing) fully fledged
Humans. If Beckett’s formal minimalism has been extensively foregrounded, this essay
draws on contemporary cognitive science and phenomenology in order to define and
examine what the author calls Beckett’s cognitive liminalism – his literary explora-
tion of liminal states of cognition and experience, of which the concept of the ‘crea-
ture’ constitutes a foundational element.
Keywords: Samuel Beckett; Molloy; Malone Dies; The Unnamable; Company;
creature; cognition; phenomenology; consciousness; emergence; predictive
mind; attunement
Introduction
The continuity and contiguity between animal and human beings in Beckett’s work
have been the subject of extensive critical attention (Bryden, 2013). The recurring
dehumanisation or degeneration of his characters’ mental faculties and behaviours
has been largely analysed as an ‘ostensible animalization’ (Weller, 2013: 18) of
human nature – following a reading of the ‘creaturely’ spectrum as a regression
from the human to the animal. As for the undermining outcome that this backward
movement has for the idea of what human creatures are, Ulrika Maude (2013: 92)
persuasively summarises the way in which ‘Beckett’s work casts doubt over all the
major premises – consciousness, intentional subjectivity, and language – that have
served to privilege the category of human’. By and large, existing approaches to
Beckett’s portrayal of hampered human creatures rely on the categorial distinction
between animals and humans in order to show how Beckett blurs the very divide
between them, assimilating the latter to the former. In contrast, this essay aims to
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position Beckett’s creatures within a different segment of the creaturely scale: the
portion ranging from lower levels of human cognition (human) to high-order
degrees of human subjectivity (Human). In essence, in the human/Human grada-
tion, I will consider the creaturely level in Beckett’s narrative as occupied by
undeveloped human cognisers as opposed to (and sometimes rancorously opposing)
fully fledged Humans or, as Beckett (2011: 86) writes in a letter to George
Duthuit in 1948, ‘the illusion of the human and the fully realized’. The intention
of the essay is not to sideline the importance of the non-human/human axis for
the understanding of Beckett’s treatment of the creaturely realm, but rather to
supplement the debate by pointing at gradations and conflicts within the human
pole of the spectrum.
The main aim of the essay is therefore to provide a richer account of Beckett’s
creatures in terms of their human (or not yet/no longer Human) cognitive faculties
and of the phenomenological experiences they undergo in the developmental limbo
in which they appear to be stuck. As we shall see, given the frequent occurrence
of the term and its derivatives in his narrative work, the concept of the ‘creature’
suggests itself as a promising angle for an understanding of the model underlying
Beckett’s fictional beings. In the first section, I briefly suggest how this creaturely
model can be read as an integration of psychological, theological and narratological
models of creatures. The following two sections concentrate on the specific cogni-
tive (mis)functioning of these creaturely minds and on their peculiar phenomeno-
logical experience of the surrounding world. On the cognitive front, these central
sections contrast contemporary scientific views on the mind’s emergent teleological
nature (Deacon, 2012) and on the predictive power of the human mind (Hohwy,
2013) with the absence of these faculties in Beckett’s creatures. From the inter-
twined experiential perspective, they focus on the creatures’ bewildered perception
of reality by drawing on the phenomenological notion of worldly ‘attunement’
(Ratcliffe, 2008). In the concluding section, I provide some interpretive hypotheses
about the meaning of these feeble cognisers, to which I refer throughout the essay
as liminal minds. If Beckett’s formal minimalism has been foregrounded early on
(Brater, 1987), the ultimate aim of this essay is to define and to examine what I
would label Beckett’s cognitive liminalism – his literary exploration of liminal states
of cognition and experience, of which the concept of ‘creature’ constitutes a
foundational element.
Models of relations: creatures in psychology, theology and
narratology
The term ‘creature’ tells first and foremost of a relation (with a creator and/or
with other creatures), and it operates as such in Beckett’s narrative work. Models
of creatureliness can be found in several disciplines, and the concept of the crea-
ture can be considered inherently interdisciplinary. Similarly, Beckett’s sources for
modelling his creatures can be traced back to several areas of his interest as a
reader (Nixon and Van Hulle, 2013). Without pretending to be exhaustive, the
present section singles out three of the potential sources for Beckett’s creaturely
modelling. The aim is to display how different models can overlap and be
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integrated with each other. Other models can be shown to underlie Beckett’s
liminal creatures, yet there is enough evidence of Beckett’s interest in psychology
(O’Hara, 1997), theology (Ackerley, 1999; Bailey, 2014) and narratological archi-
tectures to make these three models particularly significant. All three models pro-
vide a structure within which higher roles (occupied by the Super-Ego, God or the
author) are put in relation with lower creatures (the Ego, worldly creatures, narra-
tors and characters). All three models share a relational space in which creatures
are located near to the lower boundary – a liminal border that Beckett’s creatures
often attempt to cross in order to escape their relational fate.
Beginning with the psychological model, between 1933 and 1935, Samuel
Beckett took extensive notes on psychology books (Feldman, 2006; see also
Moorjani, 2004), notably on Freud’s ‘The Dissection of the Psychical Personality’
(1989), which is an explicit update of Freud’s 1923 essay on ‘The Ego and the Id’.
In the earlier essay Freud (2001: 56) famously defined the Ego as a ‘poor creature
owing service to three masters’ – the external world, the id and the Super-Ego. The
term ‘creature’ disappears in his later account of the tripartite partition of the mind
– the Ego here being described simply as the ‘poor ego’ (1989: 96) – as it did from
Beckett’s meticulous summary of the Freudian mental structure (Engelberts and
Frost, 2006). Yet the term was destined to become increasingly recurrent in
Beckett’s work, from Molloy onwards, as a key term marking fictional beings (narra-
tors, characters, narrating characters and other beings shaped through storytelling).
Moreover, creatures in Beckett’s novels are also frequently qualified by the adjective
‘poor’ (a practice he also reproduced in his private correspondence; for instance,
‘poor old Molloy’; 2011: 240) or by semantic equivalents denoting a weakness in
agency, consciousness and self-knowledge (Barry, 2008; Weller, 2013). In addition,
the presence of several indefinite ‘masters’ who harass the poor fictional creatures (in
The Unnamable alternatively defined as ‘my tormentors’, a ‘college of tyrants’ and
so on; 2009: 341, 304) reinforces a remarkable resonance with Freud’s former
study.
The resonance is not limited to semantic commonalities, but it also concerns
the behaviour and position of the agents involved in the model. In fact, Freud’s
model assigns to the Ego a submissive role, as it functions as a vicarious will
obliged to conform to the authority of its masters. Moreover, this weakness in
agency suggests a hierarchical structure between the ‘poor creature’ and its
masters, a structure that if turned into a spatial model would locate the Ego at
the bottom. In line with this mental spatialisation, the narrating figure in The
Unnamable repeatedly defers the authority of his words to a mysterious master (‘I
have spoken for my master, listened for the words of my master’; 2009: 304)
and locates himself at the bottom (‘Perhaps after all I am simply in the
basement’; 312) of a mental edifice (‘in my head, which I am beginning to
locate to my satisfaction’; 344). At the lower level in which he is positioned –
or into which he has fallen, like the rebellious Lucifer sunk into Hell in Dante’s
Divina Commedia (Caselli, 2005) – the unnamable creature receives orders and
information from his master, whose authority he suggests one should not inquire
into, for in case he ‘turn[s] out to be a mere high official, we’d end up by
needing God’ (2009: 368). For both Freud’s and Beckett’s creatures, their very
existence is dependent upon, related to and bound by the masters they serve.
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Moving to the theological domain, the last quotation from The Unnamable
makes clear that the theological model is a sort of Ur-model for any creaturely
hierarchy. Within it, God is located in a superior position as an overwhelming
present absence, and this is why, as Mary Bryden (1998: 2) points out, ‘the
hypothesised God who emerges from Beckett’s text is one who is both cursed for
his perverse absence and cursed for his surveillant presence’. In the theological
model of the world, in fact, God occupies the highest position, which is at the
same time within and without the world itself. Creatures can only refer to God in
worldly terms by what He is not, a negative description that Molloy appreciates
when mirrored in the anthropological definition of man: ‘What I liked in anthro-
pology was its inexhaustible faculty of negation, its relentless definition of man, as
though he were no better than God, in terms of what he is not’ (2009: 35). As
created creatures, humans have no access to the ontology and qualities of their cre-
ator; rather, they inhabit the same ontological basement as the Ego in Freud’s
mental structure. However, and this marks an important difference between the
psychological and the theological creaturely model, if the Ego cannot reproduce
itself as other Egos upon which to act as master, humans can bring other creatures
into their world, thus becoming themselves creators. In Beckett’s work, this
human capacity to replicate themselves into other creatures generates what Paul
Stewart (2011: 79) defines as a ‘horror for reproduction’ – a distaste that is not
limited to parents, but also directed at their offspring, which are defined in The
Expelled as ‘nasty little creatures’ (1995: 23).
This horror towards the creatures that decide, by becoming creators
themselves, to emulate, in Malone’s words, ‘a sporting God to plague his crea-
ture’ (2009: 332) is equally present in Beckett’s narratological counterpart of
the theological model. In classic narratological terms, the real flesh-and-blood
author is never part of the fictional world he shapes; in Genette’s terms (1988),
for instance, he is neither internal (intradiegetic) nor external (extradiegetic) to the
fictional universe. The authorial level remains estranged from the suffering of
the worlds and creatures it moulds, and for this reason it is always deprecated
by Beckett’s fictional beings as a position occupied by a cruel ‘watch-maker’, as
Molloy has it (2009: 31), who is exempt from the temporal ticking pain of
existence (he is, for instance, defined as ‘the cankerous other’ in Company;
1996: 4).
In order to encounter the first proper creature within the worldly narratologi-
cal architecture, we have to move from the boundary level of the author to the
level of narration and to that of the characters. These two levels coincide (Walsh,
1997) whenever the narrator is to some extent a character inside/outside the
storyworld or when the narrated characters tell stories themselves – and in so
doing create an embedded narratorial (and creaturely) cascade. It is against this
narrative (re)production of fictional beings that Beckett’s horror is often directed.
In his narrative work, narrators are creatures who refuse to fulfil their reproduc-
tive role of shaping other beings through storytelling. This refusal is intended to
cease the misery of (narrative) existence, as the anonymous narrator of the Texts
for Nothing hopes: ‘That’s right, wordshit, bury me, avalanche, and let there be
no more talk of any creature, nor of a world to leave, nor of a world to reach, in
order to have done, with world, with creatures, with words, with misery,
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misery’ (1995: 137; emphasis added). In the narratological model, then, when-
ever the character is also a narrator, or vice versa, we find an in-between
creature, synchronically created by the author and reluctantly authoring other
character-creatures.
At the same time, Beckett’s narrators manifest a sort of narratological empathy
towards the creatures they shape. This empathy is triggered by the fact that both
narrators and characters share the same creaturely pain of being unwillingly
brought into the world. Because of this ontological commonality, Beckett’s narra-
tors see in their creatures a replication of their own suffering, a resemblance of
their creaturely foundations, for which characters are therefore addressed by narra-
tors as ‘fellow-creatures’ (‘mes semblables’; 2004: 18) as, for instance, in The
Unnamable (2009: 292). To bring to an end the suffering of this (narrative) crea-
turely chain, we find Beckett’s narrators often engaging in a last round of creations
in order to produce thereafter the final absence of creatures and worlds. For
instance, at the beginning of Molloy, Molloy promises that ‘[t]his time, then once
more I think, then perhaps a last time, then I think it’ll be over, with that world
too. Premonition of the last but one but one’ (2009: 4). Similarly, in the second
part of the same novel, Moran, as a narrator in charge of finding (that is, in a
sense, creating) Molloy, promises that he ‘shall never light this lamp again’ (169)
– the lamp being an image for the light of life. The relation to their characters is
not the only narratological connection that Beckett’s narrating creatures try to
sever with one last (de)creating manoeuvre. In The Unnamable, the narrating voice
threatens his own masters (occupying the authorial God-level) with making them
the object of his storytelling. In so doing, it would simultaneously subvert the
ontological author–narrator relation and let the masters experience the qualitative
feelings of creaturely pain:
they’ll know what it is to be a subject of conversation, I’ll impute words to
them you wouldn’t throw to a dog, an ear, a mouth and in the middle a few
rags of mind, … I’ll let down my trousers and shit stories on them, stories,
photographs, records, lights, gods and fellow-creatures, … Be born, dear
friends, be born, enter my arse, … They’ll see what it’s like, that it’s not so
easy as it looks …
(2009: 373)
Within the narratological model, then, the narrating figure in The Unnamable repre-
sents a creature receding and regressing (Bernini, 2014) from his created ontology
and his creating potentialities. This recession is to some extent present in many nar-
rating creatures in Beckett’s work, and constitutes a key aspect for grasping the
meaning of their liminal cognitive faculties and phenomenological experiences.
Psychological, theological and narratological models of creaturely relation have pro-
vided important spatial and conceptual frameworks for modelling the liminal posi-
tion of Beckett’s creatures. Oriented by this relational architecture, I will now
describe in more detail the liminal features and principles operating (in) their
peculiar minds.
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Liminal features: impeded logomotion and broken teleodynamics
In his 1929–30 lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Die Grundbegriffe
der Metaphysik), Martin Heidegger famously proposed a distinction between objects,
animals and humans according to the richness of their worlds (Kuperos, 2007).
Material objects such as stones, Heidegger says, are ‘worldless’, animals are ‘poor in
world’, whereas humans are ‘world-forming’ (1995: 177). By drawing on this
distinction, Steven Connor (2014: 179) elegantly suggests that Beckett’s narrators
hybridise the last two categories by acting as builders of poor worlds through nar-
rative gestures of ‘miniature mundation’ – by creating and inhabiting impoverished
little worlds (‘make a place, a little world’ as The Unnamable, quoted by Connor,
has it; 2009: 398). Of the two features I want to present as defining Beckett’s lim-
inal minds, the first resonates with Connor’s elaboration of Heidegger’s categories
and is related to the developmental role of narratives in the navigation of the
world. Heidegger explicitly assigns to language a key role in the exclusively human
activity of world-forming. In Heidegger’s view, humans have a different openness
towards the world that is made possible, as Kevin Aho (2007: 4) summarises, ‘by
the fact that humans, unlike animals, dwell in logos’, where ‘logos is interpreted
not as ratio but as language or, more specifically, as a linguistically structured space
of meaning that allows beings to reveal themselves as such’. Language is in this
sense a means of active exploration, which makes available and sets in motion our
(re)cognition and navigation of the world. From a different, developmental angle,
Katherine Nelson (2003: 19) explains the role of language acquisition and narrative
performance in the emergence of consciousness by advancing an analogy with the
mutual constructive relationship between visual perception and locomotion. Both
in language and locomotion, Nelson explains,
each new level of understanding reached reveals new sources of knowledge
and evokes a new effort at organization within and across domains … first sit-
ting up, then crawling (new vistas appear), then cruising (again, new perspec-
tives on old scenes and newly viewed objects), then walking freely (no longer
tied to secure supports). The world was there all along, but the view from the
infant’s eyes was constrained by locomotor possibilities and thus the sources of
knowledge of the physical world were only gradually made accessible … But
the existence of supporting structures in view provides the motivation for
boosting the self to the cruising level, where such knowledge is accessible and
where it can scaffold further excursions to new boundaries, which again makes
new views and subsequent knowledge of the scene available.
(2003: 19; emphasis added)
As the development of our ability to stand and walk progressively increases our
visual and informational fields, so language acquisition and narrative proficiency
enable the navigation of new meanings and knowledge, thus making our cognitive
and phenomenological experience of the world richer and more capacious. The
functional analogy between language and locomotion is literally instantiated in
Beckett’s liminal creatures, even if it operates negatively. Beckett’s characters are
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often completely (Malone Dies, The Unnamable, Texts for Nothing) or progressively
(Molloy) reduced to a degree of immobility that parallels the impoverishment of
their narrative control and understanding in a mutual deterioration that I would
synthesise as impeded logomotion. For instance, Molloy, as Shane Weller (2013: 19)
points out, undergoes a ‘lapse from the vertical to the horizontal’, first with the
abandonment of ‘erect motion, that of a man’ (83), then taking to ‘crawling on
his belly, like a reptile’ (84), and ending in immobility. With a similar degree of
infirmity, Malone is writing in and narrating from a bed whose description recalls
that of a hospital cot; and in Company we find an anonymous character ‘crawling
and falling’ (1996: 35) in the informational darkness. In their impeded logomotion,
the more mobility decreases, the more their narration becomes plagued by gaps,
syntactical syncope and informational uncertainties – as Molloy notes: ‘when I say
I said, etc., all I mean is that I knew confusedly things were so, without knowing
exactly what it was all about’ (2009: 82). In the developmental view I am
proposing, the interruption of the fertile co-evolution of logomotion and
world-knowledge returns Beckett’s creatures to the underdeveloped crawling stage
of infants, descending from the cruising level of boosted (Human) selves down
into the limited accessibility to the world proper of (merely human) liminal
creatures.
The second disruptive quality which characterises Beckett’s liminal creatures
concerns the teleological disposition of the human mind. According to Terence
Deacon (2012: 265), the ‘additional emergent transition’ of a fully fledged
(Human) mind and consciousness is due to the ‘intrinsic incompleteness, an inte-
gral without-ness’ (2–3) in the organism. Human beings are always animated by
desires, projects and thoughts that constitute, Deacon says, ‘absences’ towards
which the mind and the organism are continuously directed – and our mind and
experiences of the world ‘are shaped by and emerge from such specific absences’
(3). This incompleteness, then, ‘is a defining property of life and mind’ (3) that
marks ‘the difference between a person and inanimate matter, between apparent
freedom of thought and the rigid predictability of clockwork’ (55). In his theory of
emergence, Deacon refers to the mind’s ‘end-directedness and consequence-orga-
nized features’ (265) (notably thoughts, the self and consciousness) as teleodynamics.
It is this underlying teleological faculty of projecting plans, thoughts and mental
representations into the future in order to modify or maintain present conditions
that allows selves and consciousnesses to emerge, develop and evolve. Even emo-
tions should be classed as teleodynamics features, Deacon (512) claims, as a sort of
‘infrastructure’ of every experience that allows the ‘tension that separates self from
non-self: the way things are and the way they could be’ (512). Emotions function,
therefore, as locomotors in so far as they push the organism further in time and
space by generating a ‘perpetual becoming’, and for this reason Deacon proposes
tweaking the term into ‘e-motion’ (512). Yet even this teleodynamic motility is
negated or resisted by Beckett’s liminal creatures, following what I would there-
fore define as a broken teleodynamics.
Plans, purposes or e-motions through which self and consciousness emerge and
develop are never internally generated or endorsed by Beckett’s creatures. When a
feeble motivational drive enters the mind of Beckett’s creatures, it tends to origi-
nate in the authorial level in the form of a voice which addresses the creature with
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imperative commands. For instance, at the beginning of his journey, Molloy has no
clear memory of why he has to go to his mother’s house: ‘My reasons? I had
forgotten them. But I knew them, I must have known them, I had only to find
them again and I would sweep, with the clipped wings of necessity, to my mother’
(2009: 23; emphasis added). Later on, the teleological necessity of his journey does
not become clearer, and he starts to move in a circle within a forest, as a sign that
the progressive linear locomotion of teleodynamics has, like Molloy’s body, been
broken. Having no internal drive or e-motion to leave the forest, Molloy would
happily stay there (‘I could have stayed there till I died, unripening, yes’; 80),
enjoying the pleasure of completion – the fulfilment of simply being in the place
you have to be, cancelling all teleodynamic tensions (‘being there I did not have to
go there’; 80). Unfortunately, a higher-level order to move reaches Molloy
from his ‘prompters’ (80), and suddenly he starts experiencing a feeling of
incompletion:
But I could not stay there, stay in the forest I mean, I was not free to. That is
to say I could have, physically, nothing could have been easier, but it was not
purely physical, I lacked something, and would have had the feeling, if I had
stayed in the forest, of going against an imperative …
(80; emphasis added)
In his own liminal mind, Molloy experiences no teleodynamic absences, yet a feel-
ing of incompletion is instilled in him from superior narratological levels; some
master wants him to emerge into mental life, to have consciousness (‘And then
sometimes there arose within me, confusedly, a kind of consciousness’; 82) and to
become Human.
A similar resistance to mental motion and e-motion can be found in Malone
(‘I am satisfied, there, I have enough, I am repaid, I need nothing more’; 2009:
174), who struggles to remain ‘neutral and inert’, ‘tepid, without enthusiasm’
(173) while he waits to die stuck in his bed – the will to die being the ultimate
subversion of the end-directed nature of Human mind and life. In The Unnamable,
a broken teleodynamics also – and analogously – affects the drive to move (‘the
essential is never to go anywhere, never to be anywhere’; 2009: 332); the liminal
mind of the narrating creature recedes from and negates the whole worldly
e-motional apparatus: ‘I never desired, never sought, never suffered, never partook
in any of that, never knew what it was to have, things, adversaries, mind, senses’
(320). Finally, in Company, even the external voice – usually perturbing the liminal
completion of the creatures with commands and desires – is responsible for the
teleodynamic breakdown. In a sort of cruel narrative torture, a voice tempts the
‘one in the dark’ (1996: 3) to emerge into full Human existence by retelling his
own memories (‘To one on his back in the dark a voice tells of a past’; 4). In so
doing, the voice tries to e-move him away from his disremembered liminal state
and ‘To confess, Yes I remember. Perhaps even to have a voice. To murmur, Yes
I remember’ (10). However, this teleological temptation is cruelly put in the char-
acter’s mind only to dash any hopes for a future development of his present state
(‘You will end as you now are’; 4).
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Impeded logomotion and broken teleodynamics are, thus, two fundamental
features of Beckett’s liminal minds – two core (dys)functional elements of their
undeveloped situatedness in the world. As Michael Holquist (2002: 24, emphasis
added) notes in his study on Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘the situatedness of the self is a mul-
tiple phenomenon: it has been given the task of not being merely given. It must
stand out in existence because it is dominated by a “drive to meaning”.’ Language
and narratives are fundamental elements that structure our sense of self in time
and enable its evolving teleodynamics, its meaning-making incompleteness. This is
why, as Holquist points out, ‘there is an intimate connection between the project
of language and the project of selfhood: they both exist in order to mean’ (24),
and meaning-making narratives are deeply integrated in our sense of being Human.
This co-operation of language and selfhood, though, comes at the price of igniting
the endless teleodynamic chain with its concomitant desires and (dis)illusions that
generate a feeling of perpetual non-coincidence. In this respect, Bakhtin (1984: 59)
describes Dostoevsky’s characters as an ‘infinite function’, as individuals tormented
with the ‘profound consciousness of their own unfinalizability’. Conversely,
Beckett’s creatures seek to finalise themselves – or, put in Beckett’s famous
formula, to ‘fail better’ (1996: 89) in their narrative projects – by resisting the
temptation of emerging into narrative existence (and of creating in turn narrative
existences). They struggle to remain or to recede into the liminality that precedes
narrative selfhood, identity, desires and e-motions. If the Human self is the out-
come, as Gazzaniga (2009: 302) puts it, of a ‘knowledge structure’ responsible for
‘gluing together’ the ‘chaos of input’ into our autobiography, impeded logomotion
and broken teleodynamics in Beckett’s cognisers overheat the glue of self, thereby
dissolving the self back into a liminal unformed and experiential chaos. The result-
ing experience of the world these liminal minds undergo is thus full of informa-
tional noise and experiential uncertainty. In the next section, I will describe this
cognitive bewilderment and phenomenological derailment using two principles
(what I call maximal prediction error and cognitive impenetrability) which not only
underlie the creation of Beckett’s liminal minds but, importantly, also affect the
experience of reading his narrative worlds.
Liminal principles: maximal prediction error and cognitive
impenetrability
In his recent The Predictive Mind (2013), Jacob Hohwy elaborates a comprehensive
account of cognition in terms of the predictive power of the mind. Hohwy main-
tains that our mind’s central faculty is the capacity to reduce errors in prediction
by continuously updating its model of the world. The world, Hohwy (2013: 15)
says, is ‘rife with regularities. Day follows night, seasons follow one another, more
power corrupts, milk goes sour, faulty breaks are often followed by accidents’,
and so on. By charting these regularities, our mind constructs models for interpret-
ing the incoming perceptual stimuli, each time making top-down predictions and
trying to minimise prediction error by continuously updating the model. Our
encounter with the world is therefore guided by what Hohwy calls ‘perceptual
inference’ (14), which is ‘a matter of hierarchical prediction error minimisation.
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Top-down predictions are compared to the actual sensory signal … and the
difference, the prediction error, is used as a feedback signal for the internal models
generating predictions’ (61). In a continuous comparison ‘between data and expec-
tations about what the data should be, under a model of the world’, Human minds
perfect their models in order to discard wrong hypotheses effortlessly, which are
then ‘explained away’ (61). With Beckett’s liminal minds, however, cognition
appears more costly: it seems rather to follow a principle of what I would call
maximal prediction error.
Most of Beckett’s liminal minds are intent on incessantly making guesses about
their perceptions and the worlds they end up in, but every hypothesis they pro-
duce is subsequently negated, undermined or impossible to verify. Beckett’s liminal
minds are thus incapable of making reliable predictions and therefore of updating
the model of the world they inhabit; because of that, they maximise the erroneous-
ness of their predictions based on their perceptual inferences. This liminal cognitive
condition in which the world is always resistant to predictions and presentiments is
well exemplified by the following passage in Molloy:
But I can make no sense of this presentiment, and that I understand is very
often the case with best presentiments, that you can make no sense of them.
So perhaps it is a true presentiment, apt to be borne out. But can any more
sense be made of false presentiments? I think so, yes, I think that all that is
false may more readily be reduced, to notions clear and distinct, distinct from
all other notions. But I may be wrong. But I was not given to presentiments,
but to sentiments sweet and simple, to episentiments rather, if I may venture
to say so.
(2009: 76)
Instead of charting regularities for the production of a model of the world increas-
ingly truer (i.e. less inclined to prediction errors), Molloy says that the only signals
he can pick out from the noise of the world are false presentiments. In other words,
he can recognise incessant variances only against/without an attainable model of the
world. This subversion of the predictive mind’s cognitive architecture leads to a sus-
tained state of bottom-up unpredictable stimuli, where the sole regularity is perpet-
ual variance – a principle that therefore continually maximises prediction errors
(and, clearly, this principle in itself ‘may be wrong’). The examples of the liminal
minds’ incapability of constructing a stable model of the world in Beckett’s work
are endless, as is their attempt to reduce prediction errors. To mention just a few,
Malone cannot guess who owns the room he is lying in (‘Present state. The room
seems to be mine. I can find no other explanation to my being left in it’); and even
when tentatively accepting the simplest perceptual inference, he nonetheless denies
that this predictive strategy can cancel out the informational noise (‘It is better to
adopt the simplest explanation, even if it is not simple, even if does not explain
very much’; 2009: 176). Furthermore, the beginning of The Unnamable famously
undermines the fundamental elements of perception (and of a storyworld) by ques-
tioning the identity of the place, the perceiver and the time of the narration
(‘Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving’; 2009:
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285). Finally, for the ‘one in the dark’ (1996: 3) in Company – who even struggles
to assess whether the voice he hears is speaking to him or to another (‘If the voice
is not speaking to him it must be speaking to another. So with what reason remains
he reasons’; 6) – the surrounding world is an unpredictable informational noise in
which ‘the greater part of what is said cannot be verified’ (3).
Past experiences and memory clearly play an important role in the predictive
architecture of the mind. Perceptual inferences can be informed by our previous
encounters with a similar worldly situation, according to a principle of ‘cognitive
penetrability’ (Hohwy, 2013: 117–37). By contrast, given the frequent disremem-
bered state of Beckett’s liminal minds, their limited faculty of making predictions
is further weakened by a second principle that I would define as cognitive impenetra-
bility. This impenetrability with regards to previously acquired information about
the world in Beckett’s liminal minds is rooted in their faltering or lost memories
of their past experience. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: 69) point out, ‘experi-
ences never occur in isolation’, and it is the fact that our ‘past continually serves
as the horizon and background of our present experience’ which makes us ‘able to
navigate through a stream of experience without getting lost’. In our continuous
‘temporal navigation’ (69) of the world, previous situations are to some extent
constantly penetrating our ongoing perceptions. In contrast, Beckett’s liminal crea-
tures are always getting lost owing to having forgotten either their autobiographical
information, as in Malone Dies (‘I had forgotten myself, lost myself’; 2009: 261),
or the just-elapsed moment of their action, narrative performances included. Thus
Malone frequently loses track of the stories he tells: ‘Then I forgot what I had said.
A minimum of memory is indispensable, if one is to live really. Take his family,
for example, I really know practically nothing about his family any more’ (201).
The only informational exceptions that enlighten this cognitively ‘impenetrable
darkness’ (2009: 77), as it is called in Molloy, are the memories and the worldly
knowledge instilled by the voices the creatures hear from superior narratological
levels. However, this authorial information is nonetheless questioned, resisted (as
by the ‘one’ in Company) or barely retained, as in The Unnamable:
I remember little or nothing of these lectures. I cannot have understood a
great deal. But I seem to have retained certain descriptions, in spite of myself.
They gave me courses on love, on intelligence, most precious, most precious.
They also taught me to count, and even to reason.
(2009: 292)
In terms of phenomenological experience (that is, of felt qualities that parallel but
are not equal to our cognitive processes), the ability to predict future events and to
access previous experiences is, like the teleodynamic projective nature of our mind,
constitutive of our Human sense of self and of reality. In phenomenological terms,
their correct functioning contributes to our ‘background sense of belonging to the
world’ (Ratcliffe, 2008: 39–40). By drawing on Heidegger’s concept of ‘attune-
ment’, Matthew Ratcliffe (2008: 8) describes our encounter with the world as a
‘realm of practical purposes, values, and goals … a background of practical signifi-
cance’. However, in order for attunement to the world to count as a purposeful,
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meaningful navigation, we need to be able to perfect our predictions of its structure
and to have a unified feeling of past experiences penetrating our present perception
(the autobiographical sense of self being the enduring outcome of this temporal
dynamic). With Beckett’s creatures, given their developmental resistance to acquir-
ing new information or to retaining past experiences – a two-pronged temporal and
cognitive withdrawal that makes impossible the very existence of a Human self –
we are faced with an ‘altered sense of belonging’ (66). Beckett’s liminal minds
appear to be before and/or beyond the emergence of the predictive machinery.
This undeveloped liminality also has important consequences for the experi-
ence of reading Beckett’s texts, as the same principles that keep Beckett’s crea-
tures’ minds in a liminal state equally affect the reader’s habits in processing
fictional Human minds. In fact, the two cognitive principles operating in Beckett’s
liminal minds seriously challenge the reading disposition that Marie-Laure Ryan
(1980: 406) has defined as a ‘principle of minimal departure’ which states that
‘we reconstrue the world of a fiction … as being the closest possible to the real-
ity we know. This means that we will project upon the world of the statement
everything we know about the real world, and that we will make only those
adjustments which we cannot avoid.’ Analogously to what occurs in reality with
perceptual inferences, in processing fictional worlds we compare our model of
the world to the events we encounter, making predictions and subsequently
updating the model (Kukkonen, 2014). In Eco’s image, readers perform ‘inferen-
tial walks’ (1984: 33, 214) outside the text (into the real world as well as into
their previous cultural experiences of literary worlds) to access information that
can help them optimise the model of the literary universe they are processing.
However, as we have seen, it is precisely a stable and fully fledged model of the
world that is missing from Beckett’s liminal minds – a cognitive quality that
affects both creatures’ and readers’ predictions and mental projects. In conclu-
sion, the cognitive liminality of Beckett’s fictional minds forces the readerly ‘prin-
ciple of minimal departure’ continuously to fail because of the principle of
maximal prediction error to which Beckett’s liminal beings are prey. Readers’
refreshing inferential walks thus become the same inferential crawling of Beckett’s
creatures – stuck in a pre-Human developmental state in which the habitual
percepts and the concepts of language narrative, time and selves are incapable of
filtering the informational noise of the world from which Beckett’s creatures seek
to recede even further.
Conclusion: creatures for a geology of consciousness
The first prominent occurrence of the term ‘creature’ in Beckett’s work actually
dates back to his 1931 essay on Proust. Here Beckett (1999: 11) explains how,
in his view, Proust’s characters are ‘creatures’, victims of Time, which is a
‘monster of damnation and salvation’ that forces these earlier simple organisms
into the (autobiographical, conceptual, extended, higher-order) Human mode of
existence:
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Proust’s creatures, then, are victims of this predominating condition and cir-
cumstance – Time; victims as lower organisms, conscious only of two dimensions
and suddenly confronted with the mystery of height, are victims: victims and
prisoners.
(1999: 12; emphasis added)
Once captured in Time, organisms are endowed (and burdened) with a sense of
endurance and autobiographical consistency in which memory of the past ‘com-
pletes the transformation of a creature of surface into a creature of depth – unfathomable,
accomplishes the solidification of a profile’ (50; emphasis added). Furthermore, the
solidification of sensory experience into an autobiographical identity renders human
beings, Beckett suggests, cognitively impermeable to the variant noises of reality;
at the same time, he criticises a well-functioning memory as a ‘creature’ of the
routine uniformity of (Human) experience:
The man with a good memory does not remember anything because he does
not forget anything. His memory is uniform, a creature of routine, at once con-
dition and function of his impeccable habit, an instrument of reference instead
of an instrument of discovery.
(1999: 29–30; emphasis added)
In the same passage, Proust is accordingly praised as a man of ‘bad memory’ (29),
for his narrative techniques manifest the gaps in memory and identity, thus par-
tially liberating the creature within the Human from his (experiential, temporal,
narrative) captivity.
Beckett’s own interpretation of Proust’s ‘creatures’, I think, provides an
important ground for the understanding of what I have called Beckett’s cognitive
liminalism. All the features and principles of Beckett’s creatures that I have pre-
sented might be seen as rendering liminal states of mind which precede (or
oppose) the emergence of cognitive faculties that turn humans into Humans – crea-
tures of sensory surface into creatures of conceptual depth. As Antonio Damasio
(2000: 16) points out, human consciousness ‘is not a monolith’ and it can be
divided into different levels. In Damasio’s terms, if the minimal level of (human)
‘core consciousness’ is a primary form of awareness of the surrounding world that
animals and humans share, it is at the linguistic and conceptual level of (Human)
‘extended consciousness’ (16) that the complex autobiographical sense of self appears.
Beckett’s ‘lower organisms’ are located on the edge of this extended level, strug-
gling to resist becoming – or attempting to recede from being – creatures of time
and memory, and perpetuating the pain of (narrative) existence by becoming cre-
ators themselves. Yet, as voiced in The Unnamable, these temptations are sometimes
hard to resist (‘One may experience the need of such creatures’; 2009: 365) owing
to the innate human ‘appetite for the imaginary’ (Gazzaniga, 2009: 220), of which
the feeling and concept of a narrative self (Schechtman, 2011) are the most familiar
results. As Beckett (2011: 102) writes in another letter to Duthuit in 1948, his
worlds and creatures are located ‘in the eternally larval’, attempting to render ‘the
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courage of imperfection of not-being too, in which we are intermittently assailed
by the temptation still to be’. In his ‘Whoroscope’ Notebook, together with his
drawing of a table of geological eras, Beckett alludes to a possible ‘geology of con-
science’ (where the word is used in the French meaning of consciousness; see
Nixon and Van Hulle, 2013: 210–12). This essay has aimed to show how Beckett
executes this plan by going beyond the strata of Human extended consciousness,
back to the limen in which Beckett’s beings are crawling away from the ontological
prison of becoming creating created creatures.
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